Redstone Risk Ltd is pleased to announce a new strategic collaboration with Risk Motion Ltd, bringing together two complementary businesses to give customers unrivalled access to consultancy support and specialist software.

The partnership combines over 50 years of experience across Defence, Energy and infrastructure spanning executive operational delivery and high-level advisory consultancy. Together, Redstone Risk and Risk Motion provide a powerful blend of programme assurance, quantitative risk analysis, decision support, and software development – helping clients move beyond static reporting towards clearer, insight-led decision-making.

A key strength of the collaboration is the ability to offer proven, high-quality risk consultancy, enhanced through the development of practical, intuitive software tools. We believe that this integrated offering of consultancy and software, delivered from a single source, will be highly beneficial to our customers.

Both businesses will continue to deliver the services that customers know and trust, while now benefiting from access to complementary expertise in consultancy and software. The organisations are already working together on a number of live projects, supporting major UK defence organisations including Rolls-Royce and Babcock. This work spans critical areas such as nuclear decommissioning and defence procurement, where understanding uncertainty and making confident decisions is essential.

Looking ahead, Redstone Risk and Risk Motion intend to expand their collaboration across further projects, including emerging IT and communications programmes, while continuing to support clients across Defence, Energy, Infrastructure, and beyond.

William Foulds, Managing Director of Redstone Risk Ltd, said: “I am delighted to be working with Risk Motion Ltd. Not only is Nathan a good friend, but this collaboration further strengthens the values that make both businesses so trusted by their customers.”

Nathan Langton, Founder of Risk Motion Ltd, added: “This collaboration allows us to draw upon our significant shared experiences to deliver stronger analysis and better decision making in the boardroom. Both Will and I are passionate about the benefits that good, practical risk management bring to our clients.”

This partnership reflects a shared belief that organisations make better decisions when risk is clear, understood, and actionable.

For more information contact:
wfoulds@redstonerisk.com
nl@riskmotion.co.uk

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We know this, of course. When I reviewed the UK National Risk Register in 2011, there was a risk stating that the Strait of Hormuz could be closed by military action. The British mitigation was twofold. Diplomatically, engage in practices that limited regional hostility and conflict whilst, concurrently, maintaining sufficient maritime assets, especially minesweepers, to keep the artery open by force if necessary. Some years later, whilst in Washington, I attended a workshop in the Hoover Building where a senior member of the Obama Administration reported that his strategic fear was the closing of the Strait and that US policy was continual engagement with Iran and Regional partners to prevent conflict in the Region. Then, two years ago, whilst in Abu Dhabi, a senior colleague from the UAE told me that the biggest risk to the Emirates was economic. Consequently, UAE policy was to maintain multilateral relationships with regional and global powers and to urge diplomatic rather than military engagement whenever a power wanted or needed to challenge Iran.

Now, in 2026, we have forgotten that conflict in the Region directly involving the Persians would close the Strait and that we would all suffer a potential economic shock as a consequence. Also, we seem to have misremembered that to keep the Strait of Hormuz open might require minesweepers – we no longer maintain such a fleet. Lastly, we seem to have misplaced the idea that multilateralism brings stability and a sense of rules-based decision making whereas unilateralism invariably brings chaos.

This suggests to me that even where a state’s thinking around strategic issues, risks and uncertainties has been mature and far-ranging, if that work is ignored, put aside or if decision-making is stupid, then why bother in the first place?

The point, I suppose, is that if we look from 2011 to now, we can see that our decisions have been flawed. We can identify that by ignoring what we knew, the consequences that we predicted are potentially upon us. This is valuable management information if we take the time to learn from such matters and have the courage to act upon our findings. We might even be prepared in part for the next global shock. Now that would be a strategic result.

Professor John Louth is senior strategic adviser to Redstone Risk. He serves on a number of UK defence boards as either a non-executive director or strategic adviser and sits on the panel of advisers to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.

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The review was radical in that, for the first time in living memory, its purpose was not to cut the armed forces or to hollow-out fragile capabilities. The commitment to spend 2.5 percent of GDP by the midpoint of this Parliamentary period is encouraging – but that money has already been spent against known items in the Equipment Programme. It cannot be spent again on items such as F35A aircraft from which to launch new, and unfunded, tactical nuclear weapons, for example. An additional 0.5 percent of GDP sought, sometime in the next Parliament out to 2034, would take our commitment to the de facto new European norm of 3 percent of GDP. This, though, in the early years, would likely fund only the recapitalisation of missiles and ordnance passed to the Ukrainians, new factories for production and possibly part-finance a new offensive drone programme. It hardly feels strategic or game changing, welcome though these additions would be. Rather, without fully costed and funded programmes to bring the vision of SDR to the front line, it remains an aspirational shopping list rather than a serious “battle-ready” portfolio of capabilities. Put bluntly, there is nobody in Whitehall who believes that the Treasury will make the funding available to meet the SDR’s aspirations or, if miracles happen and the Treasury turns water to wine, that 3 percent of GDP would be sufficient.

This is the real conundrum and frustration with the work. The authors and MoD, together, have avoided making hard, strategic and programmatic choices. Our strategic posture is NATO first, focussed on security in Europe, pitted against a Russian enemy. But we also commit to the Pacific waters through the activities of AUKUS and a, recapitalised open water Royal Navy. Strategic missile defence for the UK is mentioned but its unaffordability as a new system seemingly accepted, so we will rely upon existing maritime assets to interdict missiles and drones fired at the UK. Providing, of course, that those assets haven’t been deployed to the Pacific and Indian oceans.

We will have an SDR when the Government’s spending review is completed and the MoD’s investment programme is published in the autumn. Until then, we have a set of unaffordable aspirations. Such things deter nobody.

The post The UK Strategic Defence Review: Definitive or Aspirational appeared first on Redstone Risk.

At a moment when we feel the West might be in conflict with Russia and can clearly sense the great power aspirations of China, much of the courtship and due diligence of defence sector deals and transactions are being undertaken in the shadows. The challenge, of course, is how to conduct effective partnering, client and supplier reviews, privately, without each commercial participant arming themselves with myriad commercial officers, lawyers and accountants?

One way which appears growing in popularity is for each element of a transaction to offer up sovereignty to a trusted third party. This team would then undertake forensic due diligence on behalf of all sides of the deal, furnishing one report based on collective maturity assessments. These, in turn, would independently value the deal, articulate the risks and opportunities associated with it and generate a shared and agreed understanding of the forward schedule and how it was to be financed. As well as confidentiality, such an approach offers speed and professionalism – characteristics that we will increasingly value, I suspect.

Risk management professionals, especially those with a defence background, are ideally formed to undertake such an exquisite professional service. We shall see more of how such an approach has powered a number of deals to be announced this year. The case studies, where they can be identified, will point to a revolutionised risk practitioner service blending expertise and AI modelling that should be transformative. The art of the deal is the science of our learning.

The post The Art of the Deal? appeared first on Redstone Risk.

Historically, the management of these risks was focussed on keeping the US tied to Europe through NATO obligations and shared interests. Mitigations did not run to increased spending in Europe (by the Europeans), more pan-European cooperation or European-specific capabilities. How could such thinking come to the fore when it was a strategic assumption that the US would always provide a backstop of hard power, if necessary, physically providing capabilities such as heavy air lift, combat air patrols, land manoeuvre operations and targeting.

Now, where there was European dependency on the US, there has to be investment. In the short term, seeking a US guarantee on Ukraine and in relation to broader European security is sensible as the British and European powers lack both volume and breadth of required capabilities. In the mid-term, the British and Europeans must “buy-out” their dependencies, building a fortress Europe to deter Russia through both conventional means and under a European strategic deterrence umbrella, with the UK and French at its centre. We may not like it, but the era of small, standing forces with niche capabilities is over.  The future is back to yesterday, with large standing armies based in Europe, an unsinkable aircraft carrier on the west coast of Europe offering strategic reserves, resilience and a critical resource of highly capable defence industries and an acceptance by our populations that to live in peace we prepare for war. Strategic risk is twofold: the risk of an expansionist, militarist Russia, and the risk of a dependency on a third party that is diverging in values from us. Never again, can we be exposed to either without the appropriate responses. Our leaders understand this and are acting. What we are witnessing is just the beginning. Everything has changed.

The post Whisper it Quietly: There is a Risk That… appeared first on Redstone Risk.

Transitioning to or using Safran Risk can feel overwhelming at first. Whether you’re transitioning to Safran Risk or trying to get more from it, we help you:

• Make the most of the software’s features.
• Reuse and improve your existing data for better modelling.
• Help you make an effective transition from an existing toolset (such as Primavera Risk Analysis).
• Ensure your team feels confident and capable when using the tool.
• Providing tailored training sessions to empower your team.
• Training in Safran Risk.

We can provide a bespoke training course in Safran Risk tailored to your exact needs. Why go on a generic course, when we can build the exact version you actually need?

Learn more about this bespoke service here.

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None of this was his fault and, indeed, it is laudable that an MP is seeking to get to grips with a sector that is new to him. I wish more would ask questions rather than offering glib answers. But it goes to a deeper concern that the interdependencies of defence reside in a cat’s cradle of economics, investments, financial returns, contracts and commercial relationships before you get anywhere near the person in a uniform. These interdependencies, thereafter, coagulate to offer capability choices that are often exclusive of each other with military leaders competing for resources and preference. When my friendly MP asked whether we had a missile defence system such as that of Israel, for example, he was shocked to learn that our investment has been made on other things – such as aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy, next generation air systems for the Royal Air Force and a suite of vehicles for the Army.

Asked if we can defend the homeland, defence sector professionals respond often through the lens of our own prejudices. “Of course we can, by projecting sea and air power into the Pacific”; “most certainly, by having a highly manoeuvrable Army.” I’m less certain. If war marches closer to our shores might I and others echo my chum’s chant of “how can we do so little?” if we fail to understand and nurture the multiple elements that generate a nation’s defence posture.

The post “I don’t understand. How can we do so little?” appeared first on Redstone Risk.

First, organisations such as Make UK are predicting that the NI tax raise represents on average an additional £100k per company per annum in payroll costs. For the defence primes, in contrast, the payroll hit annually will be in the millions. Already, I have witnessed a number of job offers across the spectrum of roles in defence being withdrawn. This will mean less people recruited, the potential wastage of key national skills and competencies and a rush towards evermore corporate automation. There is a causal link between a high-skilled, high volume defence industrial base and resilience and strategic responsiveness. With less people populating this key sector in the future with a smaller spread of skills, our resilience will inevitably diminish.

Second, there are strong indicators that the cost of capital and short-term borrowing is going up for businesses as markets respond to the budget. Consequently, if the trend continues and becomes baked-in, defence programmes will become more expensive as costs grow corresponding with the workforce shrinking and becoming less flexible.

Third, overseas’ investment in UK start-ups is predicted to diminish. This will impact upon the niche technology business, rich in ideas but poor in capital, that out of necessity seek funds from investors uninhibited by borders. With the UK being seen as an expensive place to do business, international capital will not land here as it once did. This is a disaster for young and emerging companies innovating in the defence sector at the early stages of their technological development.

Defence was considered in the budget with new money for the military pay rise, a recapitalisation of stocks gifted to Ukraine and a shopping list of nominal one-off payments. But it was not considered strategically, with the fiscal decisions taken having a detrimental effect on the defence industrial sector. Just how disastrous this is for the UK, I suspect we shall witness in the years ahead.

The post Did we Budget for This? appeared first on Redstone Risk.

That this is a massive geopolitical, technological and industrial undertaking should not be in doubt. Practitioners of risk management, however, might offer some gentle advice at this time, part way through the first year of a programme post-treaty signature by the three governments in December 2023. First, in terms of a master schedule, is 36 months really long enough to deliver a demonstrator aircraft acceptable to all stakeholders’ requirements? Whilst there might be an outline specification, does that underscore the multiple concepts of operations envisaged from 2035 and beyond? I doubt it, simply because the manner of air operations in the middle of this century is probably beyond imagination currently. Second, the assumptions for the programme – perhaps captured in a Master Data and Assumption List – seem a little opaque and more the stuff of theology than effective programme management. Informed folk in Westminster and across the businesses suggest that the business case for GCAP assumes a fielded fleet size of some 600 aircraft, populating both the air forces of the three national partners, but also those of allies through significant exports. I have just published a book on UK defence exports and in recent decades British air programmes, in collaboration with partner nations, have only been financially viable through exports, especially to Middle East countries. So, of the 600 aircraft assumed for GCAP, a high proportion will need to be sold, probably to similar nations. There is a significant risk here, just with this assumption, as both European and US nations are also developing six-generation fighter aircraft in the same timeframe for the same assumed export market. Moreover, the price point for each aircraft is, as yet, unknown but folk have been speculating on a value per unit close to a billion US dollars. The impact upon defence budgets at home and abroad would be astounding, possibly even disastrous if home costs weren’t mitigated by export sales.

The GCAP concept is exciting and strategically profound. The discussion, at this moment though, should be framed in the languages of risk and programme management. That it is not is a strategic risk in itself. I hope it doesn’t come back to haunt us.

The post Sixth-Generation Aircraft: Believers Join Here appeared first on Redstone Risk.

Sizewell C will be a 3.2-gigawatt power station generating low-carbon electricity for around 6 million homes and is critical to the UK’s low carbon energy future.

The MEH Alliance is tasked with integrating and coordinating the delivery of all main mechanical, electrical, HVAC, and associated support services on the project.

The installation of cabling and pipework throughout the power station is extremely complex and requires significant forward planning to reduce threats and maximise opportunities.

We are supporting the Alliance in this endeavour by providing specialist quantitative risk analysis to simulate the impact of uncertainty, risk events, and opportunities on schedules and cost forecasts, helping to strengthen resilience and protect outcomes.

Our experience providing project controls services within the energy and construction sectors is already adding value to the Alliance and strengthens our position as a trusted partner to senior teams delivering critical mega-projects across the UK.

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