And then it happened, maybe. For years, in the top end of many a strategic risk register – in government and the private sector – sat the motherhood risk that the USA might withdraw from guaranteeing the security of Europe. In the UK Government’s risk register, it was couched in terms of the US reshaping obligations and partnerships between states. With a large defence prime contractor, for example, it is framed as both a risk and an opportunity as, if the US withdraws across the Atlantic, European states, presumably, will have to spend more on their own security and that would be good for business. But, in truth, the framing in the risk registers was performative as a world where the US embraced isolationism and international relations solely by transaction was unfeasible. A comfortable illusion that we in Europe can no longer enjoy.
Historically, the management of these risks was focussed on keeping the US tied to Europe through NATO obligations and shared interests. Mitigations did not run to increased spending in Europe (by the Europeans), more pan-European cooperation or European-specific capabilities. How could such thinking come to the fore when it was a strategic assumption that the US would always provide a backstop of hard power, if necessary, physically providing capabilities such as heavy air lift, combat air patrols, land manoeuvre operations and targeting.
Now, where there was European dependency on the US, there has to be investment. In the short term, seeking a US guarantee on Ukraine and in relation to broader European security is sensible as the British and European powers lack both volume and breadth of required capabilities. In the mid-term, the British and Europeans must “buy-out” their dependencies, building a fortress Europe to deter Russia through both conventional means and under a European strategic deterrence umbrella, with the UK and French at its centre. We may not like it, but the era of small, standing forces with niche capabilities is over. The future is back to yesterday, with large standing armies based in Europe, an unsinkable aircraft carrier on the west coast of Europe offering strategic reserves, resilience and a critical resource of highly capable defence industries and an acceptance by our populations that to live in peace we prepare for war. Strategic risk is twofold: the risk of an expansionist, militarist Russia, and the risk of a dependency on a third party that is diverging in values from us. Never again, can we be exposed to either without the appropriate responses. Our leaders understand this and are acting. What we are witnessing is just the beginning. Everything has changed.
