“I don’t understand. How can we do so little?”

One of the rare joys left to me, as I approach my next significant birthday milestone that starts, sadly, with a “6,” is to witness the dawning realisation in a political mind that the certainties offered by banal and meaningless catch phrases (probably generated from focus groups) cannot match the complexities and challenges of the UK defence sector. This happened recently when a new Labour MP sought help in understanding Britain’s military. When I explained that a significant proportion of our capability resided in the private sector with both large prime contractors and niche technologists, he seemed genuinely flummoxed that all materials weren’t held automatically in a series of national armouries run by the armed forces. Likewise, he was incredulous that shares could be traded in many of the companies that form our defence industrial base and that capital flows, by definition, are international in nature and frequently involve investment decisions taken by the rich or their agents rather than the elected. When we discussed the defence budget and future projected cashflows associated with a spend of 2 percent, 2.5 percent and 3 percent of GDP he was genuinely lost, questioning that with such sums, “how can we do so little?” The eyes glazed over completely when we discussed the risk of defence inflation in the context of flat economic growth or, indeed, a possible future recession.

None of this was his fault and, indeed, it is laudable that an MP is seeking to get to grips with a sector that is new to him. I wish more would ask questions rather than offering glib answers. But it goes to a deeper concern that the interdependencies of defence reside in a cat’s cradle of economics, investments, financial returns, contracts and commercial relationships before you get anywhere near the person in a uniform. These interdependencies, thereafter, coagulate to offer capability choices that are often exclusive of each other with military leaders competing for resources and preference. When my friendly MP asked whether we had a missile defence system such as that of Israel, for example, he was shocked to learn that our investment has been made on other things – such as aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy, next generation air systems for the Royal Air Force and a suite of vehicles for the Army.

Asked if we can defend the homeland, defence sector professionals respond often through the lens of our own prejudices. “Of course we can, by projecting sea and air power into the Pacific”; “most certainly, by having a highly manoeuvrable Army.” I’m less certain. If war marches closer to our shores might I and others echo my chum’s chant of “how can we do so little?” if we fail to understand and nurture the multiple elements that generate a nation’s defence posture.

John Louth

Professor John Louth is senior strategic adviser to Redstone Risk. He serves on a number of UK defence boards as either a non-executive director or strategic adviser and sits on the panel of advisers to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee. His latest book on UK exports was published this year by Routledge. He is a collaborating professor with the University of South Australia in Adelaide.