The narrow Strait of Hormuz is the waterway separating the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and the south coast of Iran from the Musandam Peninsula of the UAE and Oman. It should appear in some guise as an item on every strategic risk register on the planet, public and private, because the bulk of the world’s oil and liquid natural gas has to pass through its waters. If this were not to happen for a sustained period, the conditions for recession or global depression could be triggered.
We know this, of course. When I reviewed the UK National Risk Register in 2011, there was a risk stating that the Strait of Hormuz could be closed by military action. The British mitigation was twofold. Diplomatically, engage in practices that limited regional hostility and conflict whilst, concurrently, maintaining sufficient maritime assets, especially minesweepers, to keep the artery open by force if necessary. Some years later, whilst in Washington, I attended a workshop in the Hoover Building where a senior member of the Obama Administration reported that his strategic fear was the closing of the Strait and that US policy was continual engagement with Iran and Regional partners to prevent conflict in the Region. Then, two years ago, whilst in Abu Dhabi, a senior colleague from the UAE told me that the biggest risk to the Emirates was economic. Consequently, UAE policy was to maintain multilateral relationships with regional and global powers and to urge diplomatic rather than military engagement whenever a power wanted or needed to challenge Iran.
Now, in 2026, we have forgotten that conflict in the Region directly involving the Persians would close the Strait and that we would all suffer a potential economic shock as a consequence. Also, we seem to have misremembered that to keep the Strait of Hormuz open might require minesweepers – we no longer maintain such a fleet. Lastly, we seem to have misplaced the idea that multilateralism brings stability and a sense of rules-based decision making whereas unilateralism invariably brings chaos.
This suggests to me that even where a state’s thinking around strategic issues, risks and uncertainties has been mature and far-ranging, if that work is ignored, put aside or if decision-making is stupid, then why bother in the first place?
The point, I suppose, is that if we look from 2011 to now, we can see that our decisions have been flawed. We can identify that by ignoring what we knew, the consequences that we predicted are potentially upon us. This is valuable management information if we take the time to learn from such matters and have the courage to act upon our findings. We might even be prepared in part for the next global shock. Now that would be a strategic result.
Professor John Louth is senior strategic adviser to Redstone Risk. He serves on a number of UK defence boards as either a non-executive director or strategic adviser and sits on the panel of advisers to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.
